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On 30th July, 2005 in Birmingham, England, Anthony Walker, a black 
British student of African descent, was walking his girlfriend to the bus-
stop after a church meeting when he was subjected to an unprovoked and 
brutal racist attack. An ambulance arrived quickly but he was already 
dead, an ice axe buried deep into his skull. Anthony was a devout 
Christian, a youth leader at an evangelical church, ‘Grace Family Church’, 1 
devoted to his family, extremely popular at school and an enthusiastic 
basketball player.2 Not long after his death, his family received his A-level 
exam results. They were outstanding and would have secured his 
ambition to pursue law at university and become a judge. 
 
Days after his death, his distraught sister and later his mother agreed to 
be interviewed by the BBC. During the interviews, they insisted that they 
had forgiven Anthony’s murderers. Their explanation was that as God had 
forgiven them in Jesus Christ, so they forgave Anthony’s murderers. The 
impact of their comments on the British public was profound and likely to 
have been instrumental in the fact that this act of unthinkable racist 
                                                        
1 http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/news/mrs-walker-has-drawn-on-
her-christian-faith-to-find-forgiveness-for-the-two-young-men-who-
murdered-her-son-anthony.cfm (accessed 25th Jan, 2017)  
2 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/nov/30/ukcrime.race1 
 
 2 
violence in an ethnically diverse city did not escalate into violence on a 
wider scale. 
 
The aim of this essay is threefold and this is reflected in its three parts. 
The first section considers what light such defining acts of Christian 
character shed on how we conceive of the nature and compass of moral 
theology.  The second section assesses the theological warrant for acts of 
forgiveness of this kind. The challenge here will be to understand how 
forgiveness could be seen as normative or even obligatory given the 
counter-cultural and, indeed, counter-intuitive nature of forgiveness in 
these circumstances.  The third section seeks to suggest how an account 
of the Christian recognition of the virtue of forgiveness might look. This 
will challenge ‘immanentist’ approaches to theological ethics, namely, 
approaches which assume that knowledge of how we ought to live our 
lives and the concepts this assumes are inherent within our minds. 
 
In sum, our concern is to consider how moral theology might provide an 
account of the conditions under which this kind of redemptive orientation 
toward the perpetrators of violence might arise and be endorsed. To this 
end, I shall draw, in part, on important recent research by Michael 
Banner, Cristian Mihut, and Linda Zagzebski. 
 
 
Part 1. Christian character and the Christian community. 
 
The comments made by Anthony Walker’s family suggest that their 
forgiveness was not indicative of any naturally ‘felt’ love toward racist 
murderers. Indeed, it would be troubling if they exhibited innate, 
subjective warmth towards the perpetrators of this crime. The way they 
articulated their commitment to forgive appears to have reflected an 
intentional and voluntary commitment to put aside any desire for 
vengeance or revenge on their part. The implication was that any 
subjective hostility they might feel should be displaced by a desire for the 
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well-being of the evildoers. Second, what was also evident was that their 
love of enemy and the language used to express this was indicative of 
deeply engrained practices. These included a refusal to allow ‘natural’ 
subjective feelings to run their course. The character they showed and the 
way they articulated their convictions were indicative of a form of 
discipline that resulted from participation within a worshiping Christian 
community that lived from the remembrance of Christ’s forgiving 
sacrifice. 
 
So how far is the context of the formation of Christian attitudes of 
forgiveness relevant to the task of moral theology? And what does 
theology tell us about contextuality? In his Bampton Lectures, Ethics of 
Everyday Life,3 Michael Banner argues that moral theology is properly 
undertaken in and through considering the habits and life of the Christian 
community as it ought to be. When it comes to the ethics of forgiveness, 
therefore, moral theology seeks to identify and interpret the kinds of 
practices that best express ‘the forgiving remembrance characteristic of 
Christianity's rites of recollection.’4 Moral theology is inseparable, 
therefore, from the task of social anthropology which recognizes that 
‘morality exists as a practice of such a kind that if the meaning, logic, 
sense, or significance of morality is to be fathomed, it will be fathomed by 
the sort of approach and manner of investigation characteristic of 
anthropology’s ethnographic method.’5 
 
For Banner, ethics is usually something ‘rather quiet and regular’ rather 
than something that we do ‘with huge fanfare, in great debates about deep 
dilemmas or overriding principles.’6 He describes ethics, therefore, as 
                                                        
3 Ethics of Everyday Life: moral theology, social anthropology, and the 
imagination of the human, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
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essentially ‘ordinary’ citing Lambek who argues that it is ‘relatively tacit, 
grounded in agreement rather than rule, in practice rather than 
knowledge or belief, and happening without calling undue attention to 
itself.’7 This, for Banner, explains the ‘obvious and given’ nature of ethics 
in the minds of its practitioners and the fact that, although there can be 
subliminal clarity as to what requires to be done, there is usually an 
inability to provide an ‘immediate, ready, reasoned, and articulate 
account of their ethics when challenged.’8 Drawing a parallel with the 
subliminal nature of our knowledge of the rules of language, he adds, ‘It is 
a similar inability, of course, to that of the speakers of a language who are 
typically less than forthcoming when asked to give an account of its 
grammar. For ethics—like grammar—often goes with saying.’9 
 
In short, moral theology requires us to recognize that ethical practices 
reflect a mode of social participation that is sustained in and through 
subliminal commitment to an inherent grammar of action. Integral to the 
commitment informing Christian ethics, moreover, is an ‘ordinary’, 
unselfconscious orientation to the other – an orientation that responds to 
the needs of the other without treating the other as a means to an end, not 
least a religious or ‘ethical’ end. This is recognized, indeed, in Matthew’s 
account of the ‘righteous’. When the Son of Man commends the righteous 
for having given him food and drink, for having welcomed and clothed 
him and visited him in prison, the Son of Man is referring to the ethical 
practices that characterize the Kingdom. Jesus then adds, ‘Then the 
righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry 
and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink...’ (Matt 
25:37ff). What is implied is that the righteous were not using the poor as 
                                                        
7 Michael Lambek, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Lambek (ed.), Ordinary Ethics: 
Anthropology, Language and Action (New York, Fordham University Press, 
2010), ‘Introduction’, 2. (cited in Banner, op. cit.) 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Banner, op cit. 
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a means of achieving some other end. In his theological commentary on 
Matthew, Stanley Hauerwas comments, ‘Jesus provides food for those 
without food solely because they are hungry. Herod provides food for 
those who are not without food as a demonstration of his power…. There 
is, therefore, a Christian way to feed the hungry that can be distinguished 
from those who feed the hungry for purposes beyond the feeding itself.’10 
 
All this serves to suggest that if moral theology is to be concerned with 
the question of ‘character’, then it is important to avoid the assumption 
that moral character is developed in and through our concerning 
ourselves with it. None of this is to deny that Christian character, as we 
find it expressed in remarkable acts of forgiveness, concerns the mental 
and moral qualities of a person. It is ultimately to recognise, however, that 
the mental and moral qualities of a person are ‘called forth’ by the 
community (family and society) of which they are a part, occasioning an 
unselfconscious altercentricity. That is, it is necessary to recognise the 
role of the community in the cultivation of ethical practices and that these 
practices are not primarily cultivated by means of a direct act of self on 
self.11 Luther’s reflections on his conversion make clear the self-defeating 
nature of a self-oriented approach. He describes himself as having gone to 
extreme lengths in his struggle to achieve righteousness. The more he 
tried, the more he realised that his attempts to improve his character 
were anything but character-neutral. What motivated his desire to 
cultivate Christian righteousness and its associated virtues fell victim to 
the kind of self-oriented pride that was inimical to Christian virtue. In 
short, as soon as one believes one is making progress one finds one has 
been drawn into a form of self-orientation that is in tension with that 
essential facet of Christian character, namely, humility. 
 
                                                        
10 Stanley Hauerwas, Matthew (Brazos Theological Commentary on the 
Bible), (Ada, Michigan, Brazos Press, 2007), p. 139. 
11 See my essay, ‘The self-relation, narcissism and the Gospel of Grace’, 
Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1987, p. 481-510. 
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 Community and the excurvatus ex se Character of Christian 
Forgiveness.. 
If the desire to acquire Christian character risks generating self-negating 
results, do we not find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma? On the one 
hand, Christian character and the orientation toward enemy that is 
integral to it, appear to be a virtue, or collection of virtues, at which we 
should aim. On the other hand, how can we seek to cultivate it without 
introducing forms of motivation that have more in common with personal 
vanity in moral achievement than the love of other? Famously, Luther 
came to recognise that, borrowing a phrase from Augustine12, Christian 
conversion involves one’s being delivered from self-orientation, from 
being turned in upon oneself (‘incurvatus in se’) to a concern with Christ 
and the other where one is turned away from oneself - excurvatus ex se.13 
The former is the inversion of the telos for which God created us and 
constitutes a form, if not the form, of sin.14 If the desire to achieve 
Christian character can become a self-oriented concern, clearly it is most 
likely to emerge precisely when a person refuses to concern herself with 
it and is drawn to live in the light of the recognition that her acceptance 
and acceptability lie with the grace of God. The nature of God’s grace is 
                                                        
12 Matt Jenson, The Gravity of Sin: Augustine, Luther and Barth on homo 
incurvatus in se (London: T&T Clark, 2007). 
13 ‘And this is the reason why our theology is certain: it snatches us away 
from ourselves and places us outside ourselves, so that we… depend on 
that which is outside ourselves, that is, on the promise and truth of God, 
which cannot deceive.’ LW 26:387 (cited by Jenson, op cit, p. 76.) 
14 ‘Our nature, by the corruption of the first sin, [being] so deeply curved 
in on itself that it not only bends the best gifts of God towards itself and 
enjoys them (as is plain in the works-righteous and hypocrites), or rather 
even uses God himself in order to attain these gifts, but it also fails to 
realize that it so wickedly, curvedly, and viciously seeks all things, even 
God, for its own sake.’ Mark Johnston, Saving God: Religion after Idolatry, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 88. See also p. 91. 
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such that it calls us to find our acceptability not in ourselves but in Jesus 
Christ’s vicarious self-offering and obedience, that is, in his life lived in our 
place and on our behalf. This is to suggest that Christian character is 
formed in and through the gift of participating in Christ’s life and thereby 
reposing by faith on what Luther described as the ‘alien righteousness’ 
that is fulfilled in Christ in our place and on our behalf.15 In this way, life 
lived sola gratia is a life delivered from the self-contradicting motivations 
or intentionalities that come into play when the achievement of Christian 
character becomes one’s primary goal. Second, it is through calling forth a 
lived acknowledgment of God’s grace that God, through his creative Spirit, 
generates within his creatures that excurvatus ex se orientation toward 
God and others that defines Christian character. 
 
Forgiveness as Normative and Obligatory rather than 
Supererogatory. 
What we find emerging here is an account that appears to make sense of 
the comments made by the mother and sister of Anthony Walker. The 
interviews do not present their acts of forgiveness as attempts to achieve 
virtue or build Christian character. They are neither acts of ‘strenuous 
heroism’ of the kind critiqued by D.M. McKinnon or self-oriented attempts 
to cultivate moral character. For them, indeed, forgiveness is presented as 
obligatory and learned over time by people whose orientation to others is 
subliminally and focally shaped by their faith in Jesus Christ and the 
recognition of the forgiveness he enacts towards them.  In sum, through 
their participation within the ‘Body of Christ’, forgiving practices toward 
their enemies are cultivated that run contrary to human nature and 
appear counterintuitive, therefore, in secular culture.16 Far from their 
                                                        
15 Martin Luther, "Two Kinds of Righteousness," Martin Luther: Selections 
from his Writings, Ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books,1961). 
16 Cf, for example, Patricia Churchland’s famous description of the 
essential attitudes that define success in the evolutionary derby - ‘Boiled 
down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in 
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being irrelevant, however, Gee and Dominique’s statements became 
public testimony to the capacity that these practices have for redemption, 
reconciliation and, indeed, hope17 not only at the individual level but also 
at the societal level in the face of hideous evil. 
 
To summarise, the interviews on television as also those that appeared in 
print suggest the following: the warrant for forgiveness was perceived in 
confessional terms.18  Second, forgiveness is not presented simply as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing.’ She adds, ‘Truth, 
whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.’ “Epistemology in the Age 
of Neuroscience” in Journal of Philosophy, LXXXIV (Oct 87), p. 548. 
17 Cf Desmond Tutu’s famous insistence that ‘there is no future without 
forgiveness’  on which he wrote a book, No Future without Forgiveness, 
(New York: Doubleday, Random House, 1999). 
18 Two articles appeared five months after Anthony’s murder. In the first, 
entitled ‘Anthony’s family ‘still forgive’’, published on the BBC News 
Channel, the reporter writes, ‘The 20-year-old told BBC One's Real Story 
that she stood by her decision then to forgive whoever killed her brother. 
‘I did say I forgive and I do still stand by that because you have to. That's 
one of the things I was raised on and what my mum taught me.’ 
‘I feel sorry for them because they didn't know what they were doing, 
they don't understand the magnitude of what they've done.’’ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/4471440.stm 
(accessed 25th Jan, 2017) 
The second, a Christian publication, reads: 
‘Away from the court, Mrs Walker, with her daughter Dominique, 20, told 
assembled reporters, ‘Do I forgive them? At the point of death Jesus said 'I 
forgive them because they don't know what they did'. 
 ‘I've got to forgive them. I still forgive them. My family and I still stand by 
what we believe: forgiveness.’’ http://www.eauk.org/current-
affairs/news/mrs-walker-has-drawn-on-her-christian-faith-to-find-
forgiveness-for-the-two-young-men-who-murdered-her-son-anthony.cfm 
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attitude but as a practice that requires to be learned and worked at over 
time.19 Third, their orientation towards the enemy and the associated 
formation of Christian character appears to have taken place not in 
isolation but through their participation within the practices of a faith 
community – practices that include communal worship, preaching, 
reflection on the Biblical witness and prayer20, not least, praying for one’s 
enemies as in the Lord’s prayer.  
 
The picture that emerges supports Banner’s association of Christian 
ethics with forms of ‘Christian remembering’ with the attendant 
implications for how moral theology interprets it. The suggestion is that 
forgiveness is a form of life that is inseparable from the doxological 
practices and commitments that characterise a particular community. To 
interpret it aright means conceiving it as considerably more than a 
private, internal attitude, or state of mind, conceived on the analogy of 
Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in a box’.21 
 
The Incarnation and the Warrant for Human Forgiveness. 22 
                                                                                                                                                 
(accessed 25th Jan, 2017)  
19 Cf ‘A Mother’s Forgiveness’, BBC Learning 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgQyBLWFDBI 
(accessed 25th Jan, 2017) Dominique Walker (sister) ‘It was hard for me 
at first to understand what forgiveness was but…. Two years on I know 
what it is and I practice it everyday and it is an everyday thing.’ (from 
6:12)  
20 Anthony’s mother comments: ‘Anthony was my prayer partner, we 
prayed together.’ http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/news/mrs-
walker-has-drawn-on-her-christian-faith-to-find-forgiveness-for-the-two-
young-men-who-murdered-her-son-anthony.cfm 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1.293), trans G.E.M. 
Anscombe, (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999). 
22 For extended discussion of these issues cf Alan J. Torrance, ‘The 
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What defines both orthodoxy and its enactment (orthopraxis) within the 
Christian church is the recognition, constitutive of the new humanity, that 
the incarnate Son is ‘God from God’, ‘of one being with the Father’ – that 
is, that in Jesus Christ we see God present with us reconciling 
dysfunctional creatures both to Himself and to one another. If the eternal 
Word has indeed ‘become flesh,’ then this constitutes divine endorsement 
of how we are to understand both the divine nature and character but 
also the nature of God’s purposes for us. As such, the incarnate Word 
constitutes the focal control on all our theological (as this includes moral 
theological) work at the most fundamental level. To seek to interpret 
God’s purposes for the contingent order from some other foundation (or 
to relativise it by associating it exclusively with the supererogatory) 
constitutes a de facto rejection of God’s decision to be known together 
with his purposes in this way and from this centre. 
 
Second, to think from this centre is to recognise that the incarnation 
simultaneously and inseparably defines not only who God is but also what 
it is to be human. The very nature of the incarnation is such that we do 
not recognize the one without simultaneously recognizing the other. In 
the same moment, we are given to recognise the ‘once and for all’ 
(ephapax) event of God’s Self-disclosure we are also given to recognise 
the Creator’s defining purpose for humanity. In him, we know humanity 
not in some supernatural state but, rather, in its properly functional, 
natural state, that is, in the way human beings were born (natus) to be. 
 
Third, the mediation of God’s purposes in Jesus Christ is an irreducibly 
ecclesial event. That is, God reveals Himself to the community of the 
disciples and apostles generating what the Fathers referred to as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Theological Grounds for Advocating Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the 
Sociopolitical Realm’ in The Politics of Past Evil, Daniel Philpott (ed.), 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2006), pp. 65-121. 
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‘ecclesial mind’ (ekklesiastikon phronema23). Integral to the event of 
divine disclosure is the creation of a body of people (the ‘communion of 
the body of Christ’) defined by a new language and conceptuality. The 
perception of God’s being and purposes is given in and through 
participation, by the Spirit, within the Body of Christ conceived as the 
inauguration of New Creation and a new humanity. What we term 
‘revelation’, therefore, is not simply the communication of religious or 
moral ideas, or ethical instructions to be appropriated and 
accommodated within old wine skins. Rather, for Paul, John, and the 
author of Hebrews, the perceptions stemming from God’s self-disclosure 
generate noetic, epistemic and semantic participation in that community 
the focus of which is the sole Mediator between God and humanity. As 
such, it is an event in and through which our understanding and 
perception of God and humanity, our language and thus our categories of 
interpretation, are transformed (‘metamorphosed’) and no longer 
‘schematized’ by the secular order.24 Accordingly, God’s self-
communication requires to be understood as establishing a communion 
of mind conceived in terms of a second personal, I-thou relationship. 
 
The koinonia or ‘communion’ that God establishes with humanity is 
generative, in turn, of communion at the ‘horizontal’ level - not only 
among Christians but also between Christians and non-Christians and, by 
this means, within the secular world itself. Paul summarises the 
relationship between the vertical and the horizontal lucidly: 
‘So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old 
has passed away; behold, everything has become new! All this is 
                                                        
23 Eusebius, H. E. V. 28. 6, 13. Also, T.F. Torrance, Theology in 
Reconstruction, (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1996), p. 43. 
24 I am deliberately alluding here to the Greek injunctions that Paul uses 
in Romans 12:2, namely, ‘Metamorphousthe!’  (Be transformed!) and ‘Me 
suschematizesthe (Do not be schematized by or conformed to [the secular 
order]). 
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from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has 
given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was 
reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses 
against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us.’25  
 
What this means is that the exhortation to forgive does not relate merely 
to the membership of a hermetically sealed church or, indeed, to the 
sphere of supererogation. From a Christian perspective, it expresses the 
only appropriate or ‘properly functional’ orientation toward the other. 
 
In short, God is revealed in a reconciling act in and through which God’s 
purposes for creation per se are defined. To this end, God inaugurates a 
new, reconciling humanity as part of his purposes of reconciling the world 
to himself. This new humanity is defined by practices and speech-acts 
(rhemata) characteristic of that life of communion that stems from the 
triune life and mission of God.26 The resulting orientation toward God and 
others is such that to say one loves God but hates one’s sister, brother, 
neighbour or even enemy is to be a liar.27 The shape of this life is 
summarised by Paul’s expression ‘being true/speaking the truth in love’ 
(aletheuontes en agape) – indicative that there is no dichotomy between 
orthopraxis and orthodoxy. Both constitute our response to God’s 
gracious and purposive engagement with humanity and both express, 
therefore, what it is to be human in truth. Integral to this definition of 
humanity is Jesus’ injunction that we should forgive seventy times seven, 
that is, unconditionally. What is clear is that the integrity of the incarnate 
God requires us to recognise that God would not endorse what God did 
                                                        
25 2 Cor 5: 17-19 
26 John 17:7-8. ‘Now they know that everything you have given me is from 
you; for the rhemata (words/speech-acts) that you gave to me I have 
given to them’… And later ‘The glory that you have given me I have given 
them, so that they may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me…’ 
27 1 John 4:20. 
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not himself enact. The person of Jesus Christ is testimony, therefore, to 
the fact that God forgives seventy times seven, that is, unconditionally - 
the incarnate Son prays from the cross that his murderers be forgiven. 
 
This raises the question, however, whether such an interpretation of the 
grounds and warrant for Christian forgiveness takes sufficient account of 
the witness of the Jewish Scriptures. Clearly, to fail to grasp the latter can 
only lead to the misinterpretation of the New Testament. Consequently, 
although not only for this reason, we shall now turn to consider the Old 
Testament witness and the extent to which what we have argued so far is 
in continuity with the divine character and identity as it is represented in 
the Old Testament. 
 
 
Part 2. Forgiveness and the Character of God’s Relationship to 
Humanity.28 
 
I have argued that it is God’s engagement with humanity in Jesus Christ 
that constitutes the ground and grammar of moral theology. To assess the 
continuity of this with the Jewish Scriptures, I shall begin by focussing on 
three key conceptions that characterise the essential form of God’s 
relationship to humanity. In doing so, I shall also seek to show the 
detrimental impact of the misappropriation of these conceptions on how 
forgiveness has been understood within Western Christianity. To this end 
I shall draw on Cristian Mihut’s highly pertinent insights into the central 
place of forgiveness in the theological conceptuality of the Jewish 
Scriptures. 
 
                                                        
28 Part of this section reiterates argumentation that appears in my article, 
‘The Theological Grounds for Advocating Forgiveness and Reconciliation 
in the Sociopolitical Realm’ in The Politics of Past Evil, ed Daniel Philpott, 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2006), pp. 65-121. 
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a) Divine Forgiveness is Covenantal, not Contractual – the necessity of 
distinguishing berith from foedus 
Fundamental to the interpretation of God’s relationship to humanity, both 
in the Jewish Scriptures and also in the New Testament, is the concept of 
covenant ‘berith’. Although berith is used in various ways, when it is used 
theologically it denotes a promise binding two people or two parties to love 
one another unconditionally.29 It is for this reason that it has traditionally 
been used in the marriage service – a couple promise and covenant to love 
one another for better for worse, that is, unconditionally. It is precisely the 
unconditional nature of the covenant commitment that makes a covenant so 
different from a contract. The latter denotes a legal arrangement that is 
essentially conditional - it denotes an impersonal business deal, a 
conditional arrangement - ‘If you complete task x by tn, then I shall pay you 
sn’. 
 
It is no less important that we also distinguish between a unilateral and a 
bilateral covenant. Whereas marriage is an example of a bilateral covenant 
(it requires the free-minded commitment of two equal parties), the 
covenant between God and Israel is unilateral, and not bilateral. God 
establishes and ratifies his covenant commitment unilaterally in advance of 
and thus independently of any reciprocal commitment on the part of Israel. 
To the extent that forgiveness is integral to God’s covenant commitment 
                                                        
29 I am drawing here on the research of James B Torrance, most 
specifically his articles ‘Covenant and Contract, a study of the theological 
background of worship in seventeenth-century Scotland’ Scottish Journal 
of Theology, Vol. 23, Issue 1 (Feb 1970), pp. 51-76 and ‘The Contribution 
of McLeod Campbell to Scottish Theology’, Scottish Journal of Theology 
Vol. 26 (1973), pp. 295-311. Cf Alexandra Radcliff, The Claim of Humanity 
in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. 
Torrance, (Eugene, Oregon: Princeton Theological Monograph Series, 
Pickwick Publications, 2016) esp. chapter one: ‘The Father as Covenant 
not Contract God: Filial over Federal.’ 
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and covenant faithfulness, forgiveness will be seen to be unilateral, that is, 
unconditional and unconditioned. 
 
The failure on the part of so much Western theology (not least Federal 
Calvinism) to recognise the fundamental distinction between a covenantal 
and a contractual relationship between God and humanity has had a 
profoundly detrimental and distortive impact on the shape of moral 
theology in general and the place of forgiveness in Christian ethics in 
particular. Apodictic obligations that stemmed from God’s unconditioned 
and unconditional faithfulness came to be interpreted as contractually 
conceived, conditions of salvation. This is made explicit in Federal 
Calvinism’s theory of the contract of works (foedus operum) or contract of 
nature (foedus naturale). Even the New Covenant was conceived in 
contractual terms as a salvific pact (‘pactum salutis’). The result was an 
ethic grounded in fear - fear of a God who, first, required to be 
conditioned into loving and forgiving the sinner and, second, who only 
forgave you if you happened to belong to the ‘elect’. This meant that the 
God of the Christian faith was not a God whose orientation towards his 
enemies was characterised by unconditional love and forgiveness – the 
God who comes to an alienated humanity as Jesus Christ in the person of 
one who forgives ‘seventy times seven’ and desires, therefore, that those 
created to image God do likewise. 
 
b) Divine Forgiveness reflects the heart of the torah – the necessity of 
distinguishing torah from lex. 
The heart of the torah is its testimony to God’s covenant commitment and 
faithfulness (hesed) toward Israel as expressed in God’s deliverance of 
Israel from slavery. Consequently, the apodictic obligations spelled out in 
Exodus 20 (the ‘Ten Commandments’) define the nature of our response 
to God’s covenant faithfulness – ‘I am the Lord your God, who brought you 
out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery’. Therefore, as God has 
been faithful to Israel so Israel is to be faithful towards God (vv. 3-11) and 
so ‘you shall have no other gods before me…’. And, second, as God is 
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faithful to the people of Israel, so they are called to be faithful to each 
other, that is, to all those to whom God is faithful: ‘you must honour your 
parents, you must not kill, commit adultery, steal, lie, etc.’ (vv. 12-17). In 
short, we are to love God and our neighbour as God first loved us and 
because that is the only appropriate form of response to the fact that God 
first loved us. When the lawyer in Luke 10:27 summarised the torah as 
‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your 
neighbor as yourself.’ he was summarising the heart of the torah as a 
faithful Jew. And Jesus endorsed his summary accordingly. Human beings 
have been created in the image of God to image/reflect God’s covenant 
faithfulness. The so-called ‘ten commandments’ spell out the concrete 
form of this reciprocal faithfulness. 
 
Yet again, however, a widely influential theological distortion of this 
emerged in the Christian tradition. The Hebrew word torah was 
translated (via the Greek nomos) by the Latin lex (law). The consequence 
in Western scholasticism was that torah was interpreted under the 
pressure of Stoic conceptions of lex and, indeed, wider interpretations of 
‘natural law’. This resulted in the tendency of moral theologians to 
bracket out the whole context of covenant belonging and covenant 
faithfulness as it had served both to underwrite and provide warrant for 
the exhortations at the heart of the torah. It also meant that the obligation 
to forgive lost its force with the result that it came to be viewed as 
supererogatory rather than as reflecting what we were created to be. 
 
c) God’s Forgiveness is an expression of God’s Righteousness – the 
necessity of distinguishing tsedaqah from iustitia. 
The two misinterpretations above compounded a similar misappropriation 
of the concept of righteousness. In the context of the Jewish Scriptures it 
requires to be understood in covenantal terms as the righteousness of the 
God who remains true to his covenant promises. Both God’s tsedaqah 
(righteousness) and hesed (covenant faithfulness) refer to God’s 
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maintaining covenant loyalty30 to Israel, his beloved child.31 Within the legal 
apperception of the West, however, tsedaqah (righteousness) came to be 
construed as iustitia (justice). This resulted in a further dramatic shift in the 
approach to moral theology. Whereas forgiveness should have been seen as 
an appropriate expression of righteousness, it was problematic to construe 
it as an expression of justice (iustitia). The result was the relocation of 
forgiveness within the realm of the supererogatory and its reinterpretation 
in radically contractual and conditional terms. 
 
In sum, what amounts to three, theological mistranslations has generated a 
dramatic semantic/conceptual shift in Western moral theology. The effect 
of this has been to translate thinking about God from essentially filial and 
koinonial categories into legal categories - from categories that are ‘second 
personal’ in character to impersonal, ‘third person’ modes of interpretation. 
 
The following diagram seeks to clarify the difference between the 
grounding of moral theology and the grammar of forgiveness in the three, 
inter-related categories in the left hand column and their appropriation and 
misconstrual in terms of the categories outlined in the right hand column. 
 
Hebrew    Greek    Latin 
berith (covenant)        diatheke   foedus 
(contract) 
                                                        
30 Cf  Deuteronomy 7:9. 
31 As Cristian Mihut argues, hesed does not simply denote an affective 
inclination. Rather, ‘hesed is a stable and permanent commitment to act 
lovingly toward Israel.’ Mihut, ‘Bearing Burdens and the Character of God 
in the Hebrew Bible’, Character: New Directions from Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Theology. Ed. Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela 
Knobel, and William Fleeson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
chapter 17, p. 380. 
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torah   (Jewish law)    nomos    lex (Latin 
law) 
tsedaqah (righteousness)   dikaiosune    iustitia 
(justice) 
 
The semantic shift from the categories on the left to those on the right 
resulted in the displacing of the essentially filial categories at the heart of 
the Jewish Scriptures by the individualistic and legal categories that 
characterized the Latin West. The narrative of Israel’s belonging to a faithful 
covenant God was reconceived in terms of a foreign salvific system spelling 
out contractual conditions of inclusion and the requirements of justice 
demanded by an essentially impersonal and transcendent Law-giver. 
 
The distinction between the filial and legal here relates to Andrew Pinsent 
and Eleonore Stump’s lament over the loss of  ‘second person’ approaches 
to understanding the relationship between God and humanity.32 The key 
injunctions of the torah are couched in second personal terms – ‘I am the 
Lord, your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt…’ As Pinsent has 
commented, a proper emphasis on the covenant relationship lends itself to 
the language of the second person. It is not insignificant that the great 
Jewish thinker, Martin Buber, so stressed the importance of appreciating 
both the conceptuality of covenant and that of the I-thou relationship.33 By 
contrast, the language of contract is not the language of personal address 
and lends itself more readily to expression in third personal, legal terms. 
 
                                                        
32 Pinsent, A., and Stump, E. (eds.), The Second-Personal in the Philosophy 
of Religion. Special edition of the European Journal of the Philosophy of 
Religion, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 2013. 
33 Pinsent, A. C., “Cosmic Purpose and the Question of a Personal God,” 
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 1, (March 2013), p. 
194. 
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Another consequence of the shift from the interpretation of the torah in 
filial, covenantal and second person terms to its appropriation in legal, 
contractual and third person terms was a Marcionite polarization between 
the ‘god of the Old Testament’ and the ‘god of the New Testament’. One 
tragic effect of this was the compounding of anti-Semitic attitudes within 
Western Christianity not least within Lutheranism. The misconceptions 
here have been widely challenged in modern New Testament scholarship 
particularly since the emergence of E.P. Sanders’ field-changing monograph 
on Paul and Palestinian Judaism34. More recently, Douglas Campbell’s work 
provides a telling critique of the misconceptions inherent in the Western 
ordo salutis and the attendant misappropriation of the Jewish categories of 
covenant and torah.35 
 
So, what is the significance of this for understanding forgiveness? 
First, God’s commitment to Israel is covenantal and not contractual. It is, 
moreover, unilateral and not bilateral. Consequently, God’s hesed (covenant 
faithfulness) toward Israel is unwavering despite Israel’s unfaithfulness. 
Intrinsic to this, moreover, is a sustained and ongoing commitment to 
forgive Israel despite the fact that its iniquities are ongoing - as Cristian 
Mihut’s research has shown, God’s commitment to forgive belongs to the 
very essence of God’s relationship to Israel. 
                                                        
34 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of 
Religion, (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1977). Martin Buber, I and Thou, 
(originally 1923) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) and Moses: The 
Revelation and the Covenant, (originally 1946), (New York, Harper, 1965). 
35 Cf Douglas Campbell’s insightful monograph: The Deliverance of God: An 
Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 2009). See especially Part 1. pp. 11-219. "Justification Theory, 
and Its Implications." Cf also, his “Covenant or Contract in the 
Interpretation of Paul,” Participatio: Journal of the Thomas F. Torrance 
Theological Fellowship Supp. Vol. 3: A Tribute to James B. Torrance (2014), 
pp. 182-200. 
 20 
Second, the ten commandments do not articulate conditions of God’s 
acceptance and forgiveness. Rather, they spell out the obligations that stem 
from God’s commitment to his people – a commitment that is unconditional. 
(As Paul argues in Galatians 3:17, if the law adds conditions to the promised 
commitment God made 430 years previously, then God has broken his 
promise!) 
Third, the Western language of justice, which has been used so widely to 
present a contractual account of forgiveness by making it conditional upon 
the fulfillment of requirements, misrepresents the language of 
righteousness in the Jewish Scriptures – a righteousness that denotes God’s 
faithfulness to the covenant commitments he has made. As Mihut observes, 
‘hesed fixed the contours of divine agency.’36 
 
Cristian Mihut’s insightful analysis provides a telling critique of the 
‘classical picture of divine character’ as we find it exemplified in Michael 
Morgan’s account.37  The latter presents the biblical God as a just lawgiver 
whose ‘normative response of God to sin is anger and retribution’38 and for 
whom forgiveness is presented as a supplement or ‘a surplus that includes a 
change of attitude, a sense of goodwill, and an overcoming of the sense of 
being violated, humiliated, or diminished.’39 
 
                                                        
36 Mihut, op. cit,, p. 381. 
37 This section draws on Cristian Mihut’s analysis of forgiveness and the 
divine character in the Jewish Scriptures. Ibid., pp. 368-392. 
38 Morgan, Michael L. ‘Mercy, Repentance, and Forgiveness in Ancient 
Judaism.’ In Ancient Forgiveness: Classical, Judaic, and Christian, in Charles 
Griswold and David Konstan (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 131. Cited by Mihut, op.cit., p. 368.  
39 Morgan, op.cit., p. 142. 
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Mihut rightly repudiates the suggestion that divine forgiveness is 
‘subordinate to divine forensic justice.’40 It is grounded, he argues, in 
God’s sustained and ongoing covenant faithfulness toward Israel despite 
her ongoing sin, wickedness and rebellion: ‘Forgiveness is not an anomaly 
at the outskirts of a fully integrated retributive deity.  It is not chiefly the 
tamer of fierce justice, and not the therapy God needs to get over the 
sense of being violated.… Forgivingness – the settled disposition to 
forgive – is at the center of God’s agency, and is grounded in proactive, 
other-directed dispositions that figure deeply in the explanation of divine 
action.’41 
 
Definitive of the character of God in the Jewish Scriptures, Mihut suggests, 
are the dispositions articulated in the ‘grace formula’ of Exodus 34.42 
Central to this is the ‘pervasive and theologically vital metaphor of nasa-
awon (bearing away transgression)’ which presents God paradigmatically 
as a healer and forgiver of his people. Three key Biblical images penetrate 
to the ‘very kernel’ of divine forgiveness. The first presents God as 
cancelling the debt of sin.43 Related metaphors include God’s blotting out 
iniquity,44 covering it (kipper),45 and bearing it away (nasa awon).46 The 
                                                        
40 Mihut, p. 368. Indeed, on the kind of account we see exemplified by 
Morgan, ‘(d)ivine justice has theological, normative, and motivational 
primacy. Forgiveness is at best a tamer of retribution.’ Mihut, p. 369. 
41 Mihut, p. 369. 
42 Mihut takes this from Exodus 34: 6 – 7 in the translation of Everett Fox, 
The Five Books of Moses. (New York: Schocken Books, 1997), p. 455. Cited 
by Mihut, p. 372. 
43 Here Mihut adds the footnote: ‘This picture of forgiveness becomes 
much more prominent in the New Testament. See Matthew 6:12.  Gary 
Anderson claims, for instance, ‘in the New Testament the metaphor of sin 
as debt was ubiquitous.’ (Anderson 2009: 31)’ Mihut, p. 372. 
44 Ps 51:9. 
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second denotes a model of forgiveness whereby ‘the victim countenances 
the offense while forgoing the pursuit of retaliatory measures.’47 The third 
suggest that God’s primary concern is ‘healing and unburdening a broken 
people.’48 
 
The distinctive content of the controlling metaphor for this (nasa-based) 
account of forgiveness is provided by ‘two interlocking commitments: (Ci) 
God’s commitment to set a distance between individuals/community and 
their sins , and (Cii) God’s commitment to absorb in himself the 
consequences of iniquity.’49 
 
Both of these commitments stand in radical continuity with the whole 
thrust of God’s covenant faithfulness to Israel – his unconditional and 
unconditioned filial commitment to his beloved children.50 Is this in 
tension with God’s ‘justice’? Only if we project onto the narratives 
interpreting God’s tsedaqah a foreign conception of iustitia with its 
associated contractual conditions and legal requirements. When we 
interpret God’s righteousness in the light of the theology of covenant and 
the obligations that stem from God’s hesed, then a nasa-based account of 
divine forgiveness constitutes the profoundest expression of precisely 
how God’s righteousness is to be conceived. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 See Psalm 85: 2 – 4: ‘You forgave (nasa) the iniquity of Your people; 
You covered all their sin. You withdrew all Your fury; You turned away 
from Your burning anger.’ Mihut comments that here, two images of 
forgiveness – carrying burdens and covering iniquity – occur side by side. 
46 Exodus 34:7. Cf. Mihut, pp. 370-1. 
47 Mihut, p. 371. 
48 Mihut, p. 372. 
49 Mihut, p. 382. 
50 Cf. Deut 14:1, Psalm 73:15, Jeremiah 31:20. 
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What emerges is the profound continuity between the conception of God’s 
character at the heart of the Jewish Scriptures and the character of God as 
defined through the incarnation. What we also see is a clear parallel 
between the forgiveness that characterises the true imago patris  and that 
forgiveness which characterises those who ‘image’ God’s unconditional, 
covenant faithfulness. As we have seen, it is precisely such a human 
corresponding to God’s faithfulness that the torah advocates. 
 
 
Part Three: Forgiveness and the Place of Moral Transformation in 
Christian Ethics. 
What remains to be considered are the full implications of this 
interpretation of the connection between God’s nasa-awon forgiveness 
and forgiveness between human beings. The most cursory analysis of the 
grammar of obligation in the Pentateuch makes it clear why the 
indicatives of grace must be viewed as prior to the imperatives of 
obligation. To reverse this order, to make the imperatives of law prior to 
the indicatives of grace, is to convert a covenant into a contract - the 
obligations that stem from God’s grace become the conditions of grace. 
 
As we have seen, that has the effect of radically redefining the character of 
God, presenting God as a distant, impersonal ‘god of justice’ who requires 
to be conditioned into being faithful and whose forgiveness is conditional 
upon satisfying the requirements of justice. It is this ‘classical picture of 
the divine character’, to use Mihut’s description, that underpins 
retributive accounts of the atonement and the perceived penal necessity 
of Christ’s substitutionary death on the cross. 
 
Such a move presents the nature of God’s relationship to humanity in 
legal rather than filial terms. The effect of this is to redefine the impetus 
and warrant for moral transformation. In short, it has a profound impact 
on the moral psychology at the heart of the faith. 
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Divine Forgiveness as an Organ of Moral Transformation. 
Human and social transformation belong to the essence of God’s mission 
to a hostile and dysfunctional world. Although this transformation is 
articulated in various ways throughout the New Testament, most 
significant concept used to describe this is ‘metanoia’. This denotes the 
transformation of our orientation towards God and also towards the 
world - the reconciliation and reconstitution of our dysfunctional modes 
of thought.51 This is what Paul envisages in exhorting us to be 
‘metamorphosed’ in order to discern the truth.52  
 
This transformation of mind is clearly not something that can be brought 
about by our own abilities given that it is precisely our capacity to process 
reality aright that is dysfunctional and in need of redemption. ‘Metanoia’ 
denotes an act that takes place ‘from above’. What it delivers, moreover, is 
qualitatively different from any ‘optional’ perspective or ‘Christian 
worldview’. As Murray Rae argues, this is no mere duck-rabbit Gestalt 
switch. It doesn’t simply denote a different form of ‘seeing as’ or 
perspective where both the new and the old way of interpreting reality 
has its own validity. It is closer, he argues, to a ‘paradigm shift’ through 
which we are delivered from an erroneous, ‘alienated’ processing of 
reality to a new, redeemed way of relating to God and others – such that it 
is not a valid option to return to the previous one.53 Still further, the 
paradigm shift to which we are referring is considerably more than the 
kind of paradigm shift that Kuhn describes as taking place in the sciences. 
The New Testament bears witness to a paradigm shift that is sui generis, 
                                                        
51 For Paul, we are echthroi te dianoia, that is, hostile/alienated in our 
capacity literally ‘to think through to’ God’s purposes). Noein (to think), is 
the common root of both metanoia and dianoia and the call for metanoia 
in the Gospels denotes the reconciliation of our dysfunctional minds. 
52 Romans 12:2. 
53 Murray Rae, By Faith Transformed: Kierkegaard’s Vision of the 
Incarnation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
 25 
denoting nothing less than God’s redemption of our erroneous processing 
of reality – the shift from viewing the world kata sarka (in accordance 
with the flesh) to viewing it kata pneuma (in accordance with the spirit). 
For the author of John’s Gospel, the resulting metanoia is nothing less 
than an event of regeneration or ‘rebirth’ ‘from above’. To summarise, 
metanoia denotes a new redeemed orientation towards God and the 
world that is so radically discontinuous with the old that it is described in 
terms of the reconstitution of our identities – our being ‘born again’ to 
participate in a ‘new humanity’ whereby we are given ‘eyes to see’ and 
‘ears to hear’ what we could not otherwise recognise or appropriate. 
What is relevant for our purposes here is that this metanoia involves the 
redemption of our orientation not only towards God but also towards our 
neighbours. We are given to ‘see’ them anew with redeemed minds in the 
radically new light of God’s creative and reconciling love. 
 
It is not insignificant that in the Sermon on the Plain in Luke, the context 
of Jesus’ injunction that we love our enemies and do good to those who 
hate us54 is the healing of people from disease.55 The same applies to the 
parallel injunctions in Matthew. In the Sermon on the Mount, the context 
of the exhortation that we love our enemies is Jesus’ curing people of 
disease and dysfunction – illness, demon-possession, paralysis. (Matt 4: 
23-24). The clear implication is that the Kingdom of God is manifest 
where we are delivered from the dysfunctionality of unforgiving, 
unreconciling hearts and set free to love our neighbours and forgive our 
enemies. 
 
Metanoia as ‘evangelical’ and not ‘legal’. 
So what are the specific means through which God effects this 
‘conversion’ or ‘repentance’? The argument of the following section is that 
                                                        
54  ‘Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who 
curse you, pray for those who abuse you.’ Luke 6:27-28 (N.R.S.V.). 
55 Cf. Luke 6: 18-19. 
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this redemptive dynamic is enacted in and through a process whereby 
alienated creatures are given to see themselves as loved and forgiven. 
That is, the means by which God generates this metanoia is itself 
inherently filial and covenantal rather than legal and contractual. 
 
In a tradition that can be traced from John Calvin, through Thomas Boston 
of Simprin and John Colquhoun to F.D. Maurice,  a key distinction is drawn 
between ‘evangelical repentance’ and ‘legal repentance’. ‘Legal 
repentance’ suggests that the primary means of inducing metanoia are the 
dictates of law. On this view, it is when we are presented with the 
judgement and condemnation that issues from the law, that we are 
motivated to repent. Although legal repentance does not necessarily 
assume contractual categories, it can prey upon the church’s desire to 
‘control’ its adherents by presenting them with the full force and 
implications of divine law. In these situations, the law can function 
contractually: ‘IF you want God to be merciful toward you, THEN you 
must repent and obey the law!’ The consequences of such an approach 
and the messages it sends are far from neutral. The implication is that 
God does not love or forgive people unless they first deliver what is 
required, namely, repentance and obedience. The second point to notice 
is that legal repentance serves to compound (rather than challenge) self-
interest as the driving motivation in Christian ethics. For this reason, it 
serves to weaken rather than strengthen the love of God and neighbour 
and thus weakens the law, as Jesus summarises it. (Most parents take it as 
a given that if they treat their children in contractual ways that 
communicate conditional acceptance their approach is unlikely to 
generate respect let alone love for them as parents.) Third, the treatment 
of the other that stems from legal repentance is unlikely to be a love of the 
other for her own sake and more likely to be the expression of an 
egocentric self-concern – precisely what Luther recognised as the 
essential form of sin. Finally, fear displaces love as the motivating force in 
ethics – fear of divine judgement and the condemnation that the law 
generates. 
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In sharp contrast, the kind of transformation that ‘evangelical repentance’ 
describes is profoundly different. Evangelical repentance refers to that 
form of metanoia that stems from recognising God’s unconditional love 
for humanity manifest in Jesus Christ – a love that forgives despite 
humanity’s hostility, despites its alienation and, indeed, the forms of self-
interested motivation that that alienation takes. 
 
What is important to note is that the focus of evangelical repentance is 
not simply a divine orientation towards humanity characterised by 
sentiments of love and forgiveness. For the authors of the New Testament 
epistles, evangelical metanoia recognises the length to which God’s love 
goes and the cost of our being delivered from the condemnation of our 
dysfunctional response to God. For Paul and the author of Hebrews, God’s 
love for humanity finds expression in the fact that God provides the very 
response that God requires of us. Evangelical metanoia emerges as one 
recognises that the incarnate Son has provided on behalf of humanity - as 
its sole priest, mediator and intercessor - a vicarious Amen on behalf of an 
alienated humanity. Christ is not only the Sole Mediator of God’s love for 
humanity but he is the sole Mediator of humanity’s ‘yes’ to God. Such is 
God’s faithfulness and love for sinners that God himself provides the 
response, the obedience and the properly functional acknowledgment of 
God’s faithfulness that we are obliged to offer but fail to provide. He does 
this in our place and on our behalf. So what are the implications of this gift 
of grace for the human response? It means that the new humanity lives 
from the recognition that all that righteousness requires has been fulfilled 
from our side, in our place and on our behalf – ‘the righteous requirement 
of the law’ (Romans 8:4) and ‘the righteous requirements of worship’ 
(Hebrews 9:1) have been provided in Jesus Christ the sole priest and 
mediator of our response and confession. Consequently, human 
righteousness lies not in anything we can provide but in the vicarious 
faith and faithfulness of the incarnate Son. God’s acceptance and 
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forgiveness of a dysfunctional humanity is enacted and fulfilled 
objectively ‘en Christo’. 
 
Whereas, the use of law to generate ‘legal repentance’ throws people back 
upon themselves by presenting people with a message of judgement, 
condemnation and conditional acceptance, evangelical repentance 
denotes the transformation that the Gospel generates – that, as Paul so 
stresses, (Romans 8:1) ‘there is therefore now no condemnation for those 
who are in Christ Jesus.’ 
 
Is this not, however, to open the door to a lax antinomianism? As the case 
of Anthony Walker’s mother and sister appears to indicate, the perception 
of the extent of God’s forgiveness generates a kind of discipleship and 
commitment that generates practices and Christian character of a kind 
that exceed anything that presenting people with the divine or moral law 
could possibly achieve. Still further, evangelical repentance of this kind 
generates a second-person, ‘I-thou’ relationship that is transformative. 
Susan Eastman comments: ‘Paul's account in Romans of the divine action 
that moves persons into a new identity of self-in-relationship 
demonstrates genuinely second-personal qualities: it is loving, non-
transactional, noncompetitive, mutual, and constitutive of personal 
agency.’56 
 
Testimony to the ‘evangelical’ basis of repentance is not only to be found 
in Paul or John or Hebrews; it is also present throughout the Synoptics. 
The story of Zacchaeus in Luke 19 is testimony to the psychology of 
evangelical repentance. Luke makes it clear that Zacchaeus came to Jesus 
motivated not by guilt or by repentance but simply by curiosity. What 
Jesus does upon seeing Zacchaeus is neither to condemn him nor, indeed, 
                                                        
56 Susan Eastman, ‘The Shadow Side of Second-Person Engagement: Sin in 
Paul's Letter to the Romans’ in European Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, Volume 5, Number 4, (Winter 2013). 
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to remind him of the law in the hope that this might deliver him from the 
error of his ways. What issues from Jesus is categorical affirmation of his 
dignity in the presence of those who, understandably, despise him – 
people who were frustrated, indeed, by Jesus’ attitude. (v. 7). Urging 
Zacchaeus to hurry up, he insists he wants to come and stay and eat with 
him. The immediate consequence of Zacchaeus’ perception of Jesus’ love 
for him is the transformation of his orientation towards those whom he 
has used. Not only does he make amends (the reparation or satisfaction 
that legal repentance requires), but he returns what he owes several 
times over. In short, the core command of the torah is fulfilled in 
Zacchaeus’ consequent love of his neighbours. A similar logic is evident in 
Jesus’ dealings with the woman at the well and the woman caught in 
adultery.  
 
Evangelical repentance is also central to the ‘parable of the lost son’ 
despite the fact that it is used to argue for the opposite. The renegade 
younger son breaks every facet of the torah beginning with his public 
dishonouring of his father wishing his father were dead – he had been 
committing murder in his heart. He then went on to break almost every 
other defining Jewish taboo culminating symbolically in his sharing meals 
with unclean animals. The son then determines to return home. His 
motivation, however, is not guilt or fear of condemnation. What motivates 
him is the fact that he covets his father’s servants given that they are 
eating better than he is. Consequently, he prepares a speech designed to 
manipulate his father and use him still further. Rather than presenting the 
son with the full force of the law, the father runs to embrace him without 
seeking evidence of contrition or repentance. What is significant is that, in 
the arms of his father, the contractual element in the son’s pre-prepared 
speech disappears and there are hints of genuine metanoia; ‘Father, I have 
sinned against heaven and before you; I am no longer worthy to be called 
your son.’ 
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Elsewhere, I have discussed the relevance of evangelical repentance in the 
contemporary context – as witnessed, for example, in the interaction 
between Desmond Tutu and Winnie Mandela at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Suffice it to say, the TRC itself 
and its widely recognised contribution to the peaceful transition from 
apartheid in South Africa is testimony to the socio-political significance of 
forgiveness and its capacity to generate metanoia.57 As Miroslav Volf 
argues so convincingly, far from undermining justice, ‘every act of 
forgiveness enthrones justice…’58 
 
In sum, evangelical repentance serves the law and the purposes of justice 
rather than undermining them. It does so by calling forth an attitude to 
God and to other that summarises the injunctions at the heart of the torah 
and ‘images’ or reflects God’s righteous orientation toward humanity. 
 
Forgiveness and Semantic Externalism. 
The case with which we began, as also the case of Jill Saward, the victim in 
the Ealing Vicarage rape case,59  reflected the capacity of evangelical 
metanoia to generate actions that transcend what would normally be 
                                                        
57 See my essay in Philpott (ed), op cit. 
58 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of 
Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation, (Nashville, Tennessee, Abingdon 
Press, 1996), p. 123. 
59 While writing this paper, it was reported that Jill Saward had died of a 
stroke, aged 51. After the unthinkable violence that she and her family 
experienced in her home, she met and was reconciled with, the person 
primarily responsible for these horrendous acts. In a newspaper 
interview, she emphasises the contribution of her Christian faith: ‘I don't 
think I'd be here today without my Christian faith. That's what got me 
through.’ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1512403/Its-not-
whether-you-can-or-cant-forgive-its-whether-you-will-or-wont.html 
(accessed 5 January, 2017) 
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considered normative, namely, what one could publically advocate that all 
people do in similar circumstances.60 
 
Such cases raise questions about the way such people recognise and 
appropriate what they perceive to be the right action. What emerges is 
that, as Kierkegaard demonstrates so convincingly in Philosophical 
Fragments,  the ‘remembering’ of God’s purposes that stems from the 
incarnation is radically different from a Socratic remembering of what is 
right. The former is grounded in the recognition of God’s particular, 
historical, redemptive engagement with humanity whereas the ‘Socratic’ 
involves making explicit what is universally immanent within the human 
mind - a form of remembering that might be occasioned by an historical 
event but for which no historical event can ever have ‘decisive 
significance’.61 The implications are clear: without the recognition of 
historically enacted divine forgiveness, moral theology of this kind 
recognises no obligation to forgive. 
 
Space does not allow us to investigate the semantic implications of this 
further. Suffice it to say, the significance of Jesus Christ for moral theology 
is not simply that he facilitates the articulation of moral obligations. Still 
further, the history of God’s engagement with humanity defines the very 
                                                        
60 Cf Bernard Gert’s Kantian definition of moral actions as what one could 
publically advocate that all people do in parallel circumstances. The Moral 
Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality, (New York, Harper and 
Row, 1970). 
61 An immanentist approach to moral theology would assume that we 
already know the content of morality and simply ‘re-cognise’ what is 
already inherent in our minds. Kierkegaard exposed the incompatibility of 
this (‘Socratic’) approach with Christianity because, on such an account, 
no historical event or person can have ‘decisive significance’. Edna H. 
Hong & Howard V. Hong (eds.) Johannes Climacus, Philosophical 
Fragments, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), chap 1. 
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meaning of the relevant concepts. It is here we see the significance of a 
move made by Linda Zagzebski in Exemplarist Moral Theory.62 Zagzebski 
challenges the assumption that the fundamental conceptuality of moral 
action should be traced to ethical concepts whose meaning exists ‘in our 
heads’. Zagzebski’s approach to moral theory suggests we start not with 
moral concepts but with ‘exemplars of moral goodness identified directly 
by the emotion of admiration.’ 
 
This approach makes most sense when it is interpreted in the light of a 
semantically externalist, as opposed to a descriptivist, account of the 
language of moral theology. An ‘externalist’ account understands its 
language as determined by means of its ability to track reality63 and, 
second, by ‘a social linguistic network in which ordinary speakers defer to 
experts.’64 In Zagzebski’s view, both aspects of such an account apply in 
Christian ethics central to which we find not a set of moral principles but 
Jesus Christ, Immanuel and a community whose life is constituted and 
defined by the confession ‘Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God’ – 
that is, an indexical, ‘second person’ identification of the exemplar!  What 
defines this gathered community is what Kierkegaard referred to as that 
‘kinship’ which the eternal establishes with humanity in time65  – a 
kinship that transforms our epistemic bases and thus every facet of our 
perception and orientation. What the Christian and thus the Christian 
ethicist remembers is that communion which God freely establishes with 
humanity in history.  It is that same remembrance (anamnesis) that 
defines the ‘sacrament of communion’, therefore, that also defines the 
content of Christian moral theology. At the heart of both is what we might 
                                                        
62 Linda Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, (Oxford, OUP, 2017). 
63Zagzebski writes, ‘The fact that we are thinking/talking about H2O 
when we think or say “water” is determined by the fact that water is H2O, 
not by an idea in our minds.’ 
64 Zagzebski, pp. 13-14. 
65 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 480. 
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call ‘reconciled exemplarism’, that is, forms of life where our perceptions 
of what is admirable are transformed such that we are given to share in 
‘that mind which was in Christ Jesus’. What distinguishes this from a more 
generic moral exemplarism, is that the function of this ‘exemplar’ does not 
lie in his exemplifying a set of moral ideals but, rather, in the fact that he 
mediates a relationship. The sole Mediator between God and humanity is 
a person and not a moral or legal system. The primary ministry of Jesus 
Christ is not to exemplify and remind us of ethical categories immanent 
within our minds (heads). Rather, it is to present God’s redemptive love 
for an alienated humanity in such a way as to redeem our frames of 
reference, reconcile our orientation toward others and provide a language 
through which we might indwell God’s world in new and properly 
functional ways. 
I began by recounting the violent, racially motived murder of Anthony 
Walker and the commitment of his mother and sister to forgive those 
responsible. This counter-cultural commitment to forgive was seen to be 
a form of Christian ‘remembering’ – remembering that sustained an 
ongoing commitment to embody God’s forgiveness of them which they 
witnessed in Jesus Christ and which invited them to do the same. 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the Biblical, theological, 
epistemic, and semantic warrant for an approach to Christian ethics that 
sees forgiveness as foundational. The account of moral theology that 
emerges cannot be translated into the terms of a ‘natural law’ ethic or 
even into a virtue ethic per se. What emerges is an ethic that lives from a 
remembering (anamnesis) of God’s historical deliverance of his people. 
This remembering defines the torah and the identity of Israel.66 It also 
defines the sacraments and the anamnesis enacted through them. I have 
suggested that this remembering both holds forth and inspires that form 
of participation that defines the very essence of Christian existence. I have 
                                                        
66 Cf. Deuteronomy 11:18-21. 
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sought to present this as a sui generis form of what might be termed 
‘reconciled exemplarism’. 
 
In summary, the practices and forms of speech that reflected the Walkers’ 
remembering of Jesus Christ exemplified the life of the new creation and 
God’s capacity to bring reconciliation through it. The narrative of their act 
of forgiveness, as also that of Jill Saward, challenges moral theology to 
conceive its task in light of the One who has borne away our 
transgressions, separated our offenses from us and absorbed the full 
weight of their consequences. It also invites Christian ethics to define 
itself exclusively with recourse to ‘that mind which was in Christ Jesus’ 
recognised as the true ‘image of the Father’ and the inaugurator of God’s 
Kingdom. When moral theology is conceived with recourse to the sole 
Mediator of God’s purposes for humanity, its impetus, warrant and 
criterion are found to lie exclusively in that filial orientation that defines 
the life of the New Humanity. To that end, it also finds itself employing a 
language of obligation that tracks the rhemata (speech-acts) that he 
mediates. 
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theology. An assessment of the biblical and theological warrant for Christian 
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‘reconciled exemplarism’ and also ‘semantic externalism’ - where its language tracks 
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